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HAVE PRENUP, WILL TRAVEL: WHY
ENGLAND’S LAW ON MARITAL
AGREEMENTS HAS ATTRACTED
FORUM SHOPPERS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN FIGHT BACK
INTRODUCTION

W

inston Churchill, a paragon of English manhood, once got
into a tiff with socialite Nancy Astor at Blenheim Palace,
his La/ilial ho/eZ MrsZ #stor said to !hurQhill: 9dUcL U were /ar[
ried to you, U’d put poison in your QoLLee,8 to whiQh he replied: 9UL
U were /arried to you, U’d drinH itZ81 The English have long held
a unique view of marriage, and in recent years, their uniquely
English way of doing things has been aptly illustrated through
the Qountry’s struggle to /oderni`e its /atri/onial legal re[
gime. In this climate, marital agreements have become a particularly thorny issue that has fallen largely to English courts to
solve, as parliament is either unable or unwilling to address the
topic.
7nLortunately, England’s /erQurial approaQh to /arital
agreements has become an international problem. In recent
years, prospective divorcées from around the globe have flocked
to English Qourts to taHe advantage oL the Qountry’s laws, whiQh
generally favor the party seeking to invalidate a marital agreement, due to a historic aversion to marital agreements and failure to modernize the matrimonial regime.2 This forum-shopping
phenomenon is problematic because English courts regularly
disregard foreign marital agreements that would be perfectly
valid and binding in other JurisdiQtionsZ Parlia/ent’s reluQtanQe
to formally address marital agreements in any significant way
is likely due to the fact that such agreements implicate a variety
of complicated policy considerations.

1. Though it has been debated whether this exact exchange actually took
place, it has been well-documented by Churchill biographers and, as such, has
left a mark in the annals of history. See generally RICHARD LANGWORTH,
CHURCHILL IN HIS OWN WORDS xii (2008).
2. See infra Part I.
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Marital agreements3 are QontraQts 9between parties Qonte/[
plating marriage that alter or confirm the legal rights and obligations that would otherwise arise under the laws governing
/arriages that end in either divorQe or deathZ84 Thus, a marital
agreement empowers parties to dispel with default matrimonial
law and, in its place, insert their vision on how to best dissolve
their union.
There has been a significant rise in popularity of marital
agreements in recent years. A 2013 study conducted by the
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers noted that 63 percent of member attorneys cited an increase in requests for prenuptial agreements within the past three years.5 :tudies oL 9/il[
lennials8 show that people are getting /arried later,6 and it log-

3. For the purposes of this Note, the term 9marital agreements8 will be
used throughout to identify both prenuptial (agreements executed before the
marriage) and postnuptial agreements (agreements executed following the
marriage). See Jens M. Scherpe, Introduction to the Project, in MARITAL
AGREEMENTS AND PRIVATE AUTONOMY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 3 (Jens
M. Scherpe ed., 2012). Prenuptial and postnuptial agreements are distinguishable, and this Note acknowledges the alternate holdings of the Board of the
Privy Council in MacLeod v. MacLeod and the Supreme Court of England’s
holding in Radmacher v. Granatino, but the nuances between the two forms of
agreement will not be addressed in depth here. While in the Board of the Privy
Council made a distinction between the two forms in MacLeod, the Supreme
Court of England in Radmacher essentially 9concluded that there should be no
general distinction between ante-nuptial and post-nuptial agreements.8 Jane
Kentridge, Case Comment: Radmacher (formerly Granatino) v Granatino
[2010] UKSC 42, U.K. SUP. CT. BLOG (Sept. 6, 2015, 1:42 PM),
http://ukscblog.com/case-comment-radmacher-formerly-granatino-v-granatino-2010-uksc-42/; see also Jane Mair, The Marriage Contract: Radmacher v.
Granatino, 15 EDINBURGH L. REV. 265, 267 (2011). Today, the Radmacher position reflects the general consensus among recent jurisprudence. See Kentridge, supra note 3; Mair, supra note 3.
4. Gary A. Debele & Susan C. Rhode, Prenuptial Agreements in the US,
INT’L ACAD. FAM. LAW. (2006), https://www.iafl.com/library/iaml_law_journal/back_issues/volume_1/prenuptial_agreements_in_the_united_states/index.html. This Note will focus on marriages ending in divorce.
5. Increase of Prenuptial Agreements Reflects Improving Economy and Real
Estate Market: Survey of Nation’s Top Matrimonial Attorneys Also Cites Rise
in Women Requesting Prenups, AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. (Oct. 16, 2013),
http://www.aaml.org/about-the-academy/press/press-releases/pre-post-nuptial-agreements/increase-prenuptial-agreements-re.
6. See Steven Martin, Nan Marie Astone, & H. Elizabeth Peters, Fewer
Marriages, More Divergence: Marriage Projections For Millenials To Age 40,
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ically follows that prospective spouses are bringing more individual assets into a marriage than couples have in the past.7 In
the event of a divorce, spouses without an agreement often have
to litigate to resolve the dispute, which often results in protracted proceedings where judicial discretion becomes the ultimate arbiter of financial outcomes.8 As an alternative, marital
agreements offer couples predictability, a means to plan for their
financial future with certainty, protection of future wealth, a
plan to provide for children from previous relationships, a shield
from liability when one spouse enters a marriage with outstanding debt obligations, and, most importantly, a means to avoid
judicial involvement in their private affairs.9
There are, however, substantial policy arguments against
marital agreements. Some believe that default matrimonial law
adequately protects parties, and that couples should not be allowed to contract around it.10 Yet, prohibiting freedom of contract runs contrary to notions of autonomy and personal liberty,
especially in the matrimonial context. By allowing judges to adjudicate personal disputes, the court is vested with more power
to dictate financial and personal matters than the parties themselves. Critics of marital agreements11 have also argued that
URB. INST. (Apr. 2014), http://www.urban.org/research/publication/fewer-marriages-more-divergence-marriage-projections-millennials-age-40/view/full_report; Frank Newport & Joy Wilke, Most in U.S. Want Marriage, but Its Importance Has Dropped, GALLUP (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163802/marriage-importance-dropped.aspx.
7. See Tami Luhby, Millenials Say No to Marriage, CNN MONEY (July 20,
2014, 7:33 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/07/20/news/economy/millennialsmarriage/; Laura Cohen, The Millenial’s New Marriage Concept, MARIE CLAIRE
(Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.marieclaire.com/sex-love/advice/a10251/millennialmarriage-concept/; Gillian B. White, The Institution of Marriage: Still Going
Strong, ATLANTIC (June 16, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/millennials-delaying-marriage-money-weddings/395870/.
8. Cheryl L. Young, Is a Prenup a Must for Most Couples?, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 1, 2015, 11:37 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/is-a-prenuptial-agreement-a-must-for-most-couples-1425271056.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Opponents of marital agreements also argue that these contracts are a
means of subjugating the nonmoneyed, weaker party, traditionally the prospective wife. While this argument remains relevant in some situations, it is
largely based in outdated gender stereotypes. Women are increasingly taking
it upon themselves to seek out marital agreements. In a majority of marriages
today, wives have an equal or higher education level than their husbands, and
in over a quarter of marriages, wives earn more than their husbands. Further,
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9the nastiness that Qan arise in negotiating a d/arital agree[
/entc Qan Qripple a /arriage beLore it even startsZ812 This argument, which advocates against full financial disclosure prior to
marriage, seems rather pessimistic about the emotional fortitude of prospective spouses.13 Marital agreement negotiations
require a certain level of open dialogue between prospective
spouses, but this candor can hardly be seen as a drawback to the
beginning of a marital union.14 If anything, this communication
would seem to create a stronger foundation for a marriage.15
These policy arguments have been hotly debated around the
world, with each nation reaching different conclusions about
marital agreements.16 Though most countries have acknowledged the frequency with which such agreements are being used,
internationally, they are not treated consistently.17 A disturbing

women are increasingly participating and succeeding in business, their rise
aided by changing social expectations and the recent push to expand family
leave policies. Assuming these trends continue, marriage will eventually carry
greater economic value for men than for women. See Barbara A. Atwood &
Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law For Premarital and Marital Agreements, 46
FAM. L.Q. 313, 315 (2012). Additionally, a 2015 study by the American Academy of International Lawyers found that 46 percent of practitioners noted an
increase in women initiating requests for these agreements. See Increase of
Prenuptial Agreements Reflects Improving Economy and Real Estate Market:
Survey of Nation’s Top Matrimonial Attorneys Also Cites Rise in Women Requesting Prenups, supra note 5; see also Luckwell v. Limata [2014] EWHC
(Fam) 502 (Eng.) (noting that the nonmoneyed spouse was the husband, who
received a settlement that effectively voided the marital agreement).
12. Young, supra note 8.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See Gabriel Cheong, Prenuptial Agreements Around the World, MASS.
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.massachusetts-prenuptial-agreements.com/prenuptial-agreement/prenuptial-agreements-aroundthe-world/.
17. International marriages are on the rise, especially in Europe. For example,
[c]alculations by Giampaolo Lanzieri, an Italian demographer, show that in France the proportion of international
marriage rose from about 10% in 1996 to 16% in 2009. In Germany, the rise is a little lower, from 11.3% in 1990 to 13.7%
in 2010. Some smaller countries have much higher levels.
Nearly half the marriages in Switzerland are international
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trend has emerged in recent years where prospective divorcées
actively seek out a divorce in a jurisdiction that favors their position’s interpretation oL the /artial agree/entZ18 Because legal
treatment of marital agreements differs so greatly amongst nations, jurisdiction and choice of law can be decisive.
In the realm of international marital agreement law, no country has become more problematic than England. English matrimonial law, codified in the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973
(MCA)19, does not formally recognize marital agreements, and
only recently have courts recognized them as some evidence of
the parties’ intentions with respeQt to LinanQial settle/ent upon
divorce.20 Because of this treatment, marital agreements that
are binding elsewhere are often disregarded by English courts,
where judges exercise wide discretion over financial provisions
in divorce settlements, resulting in significantly larger settlement awards for nonmoneyed spouses than would be the case in
other jurisdictions.21 This is problematic because it results in
judges substituting their own financial judgments for terms bargained for and agreed to by parties that previously negotiated a
marital agreement.22
Procedurally, forum shoppers are enticed by English courts because marital agreements are not subject to a conflict-of-laws
analysis in England. Many other jurisdictions analyze marital
agreements as contracts and apply a conflict-of-laws analysis to

ones, up from a third in 1990. Around one in five marriages
in Sweden, Belgium and Austria involves a foreign partner.
Herr and Madame, Señor and Mrs, ECONOMIST (Nov. 12, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/21538103. Further, one study estimated that
9the total number of cross-border marriages among 25-39-year-olds . . . was
about 12 m[illion] in 2000.8 Id.
18. See Mark Harper & Brett Frankle, An English Practitioner’s View on
Pre-Nuptial, Post-Nuptial and Separation Agreements, in MARITAL
AGREEMENTS AND PRIVATE AUTONOMY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 122, 124
(Jens M. Scherpe ed., 2012).
19. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, c. 18 (Eng.).
20. See Rebecca Lang, Nuptial Agreements. Where Have We Got To and
Where Are We Going?, 5 PRIV. CLIENT BUS. 248, 249 (2014).
21. See Harper & Frankle, supra note 18, at 124 n.8 (citing a cover story in
Sunday Times Magazine on October 9, 2005, about divorce in England).
22. Id.
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foreign marital agreements.23 English courts apply such an analysis when considering international commercial contracts,24 but,
when an English court exercises jurisdiction over a divorce, all
relevant documents (including a marital agreement) are analyzed under English law as part of the divorce proceeding, regardless of the nationality of the parties or the choice of law in
the marital agreement.25 This is partly due to the fact that English matrimonial law is difficult to reconcile with legal regimes
in the rest of continental Europe.26 As a result of the perceived
unfairness of the current law, England has earned a reputation
as 9the divorQe Qapital oL the worldZ827 Even more colorfully, some
reLer to the Qurrent state oL the law as a 9gold-digger’s Qharter8
because of the ease with which one can convince an English court
to disregard a marital agreement.28
Nonetheless, English domestic matrimonial law has been reformed to an extent. In 2010, the Supreme Court of England inspired hope for reform in Radmacher v. Granatino, which abandoned the old rule that marital agreements are per se invalid as
contrary to public policy and established criteria for analyzing
such agreements.29 In practice, however, English courts have
failed to apply the Radmacher test consistently, particularly
with regards to foreign marital agreements, making it seem that
little has actually changed.30 Following Radmacher, courts have
come to wildly different conclusions in cases with similar facts
and generally are reluctant to find that both parties to a marital
agreement possessed the requisite understanding of the agree-

23. See infra Part IV.
24. See George A. Zaphiriou, Choice of Forum and Choice of Law Clauses in
International Commercial Agreements, 3 INT’L TRADE L.J. 311, 333 (1978).
25. See Lang, supra note 20.
26. See Joanna Miles, Marital Agreements and Private Autonomy in England and Wales, in MARITAL AGREEMENTS AND PRIVATE AUTONOMY IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 89, 93 (Jens M. Scherpe ed., 2012).
27. Robert E. Rains, A Prenup for Prince William and Kate? England Inches
Toward Twentieth Century Law of Antenuptial Agreements; How Shall It Enter
The Twenty-First?, 23 FLA. J. INT’L L. 447, 477 (2011).
28. Harper & Frankle, supra note 18, at 124.
29. See generally Kentridge, supra note 3.
30. One English practitioner and scholar noted that, 9from a practitioner’s
perspective, when we come to look at how [marital] agreements work in practice, one might query whether anything has really changed.8 Harper &
Frankle, supra note 18, at 123.
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ment at the time of execution, effectively invalidating most marital agreements.31 Despite an exhaustive study by the English
Law !o//ission _9Law !o//ission8^32 on marital agreements,
legislative reform is not imminent and forum shopping continues to be a problem.33 As a result, foreign marital agreements
will continue to be disregarded by English courts, unless they
begin treating marital agreements as contracts entitled to a conflict-of-laws inquiry. A conflict-of-laws inquiry will enable courts
to determine the proper law to apply when faced with an international marital agreement, thus giving meaning to validly executed marital agreements and eliminating the incentive for nonmoneyed spouses to file for divorce in England.
This Note will analyze how current matrimonial law in England affects the enforceability of foreign marital agreements,
while proposing a temporary, judicially implemented solution of
reviewing foreign marital agreements through a conflict-of-laws
inquiry, pending domestic legislative reform.34 Part I will outline
the default English matrimonial rules and the extent to which
courts have tolerated marital agreements in the past. Section A
will discuss the historical approach to marital agreements in
England and the policy underlying the historical norms. Section
B will briefly summarize the relevant statutory matrimonial law
in England (namely the MCA), and section C will analyze the
treatment of marital agreements in the courts. Part II will examine the Radmacher deQision and disQuss parlia/ent’s Lailure

31. See Lang, supra note 20.
32. See LAW COMMISSION, MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY, NEEDS AND AGREEMENTS
para.
1.32
(2014),
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/lc343_matrimonial_property [hereinafter LAW COMMISSION].
The Law Commission is a nonpolitical, independent body that was set up by
parliament in 1965 to keep the law of England and Wales under review and to
recommend reform where it is needed. See Elizabeth Cooke & Spencer Clarke,
Law Commission’s Report on Marital Property, Needs and Agreements, 48 FAM.
L.Q. 359 (2014).
33. One bill has been introduced in parliament but has stalled and is unlikely to proceed any further. See Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill [HL] 201314, U.K. PARLIAMENT, http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2013-14/divorcefinancialprovision.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017).
34. This Note does not focus on divorces between English citizens, though
the implications for English natives are potentially massive as well. See Judge
Overrides Prenup as Bob the Builder Tycoon’s Daughter Divorces, GUARDIAN
(Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/mar/01/judge-overrides-prenup-bob-the-builder-divorce.
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to respond with statutory reform. Part III will illustrate how forum shopping continues to be a problem post-Radmacher. Section A will explain how foreign marital agreements come under
the jurisdiction of English courts and why this is problematic
from a forum-shopping perspective. Section B will demonstrate
how English courts continue to treat foreign marital agreements
inconsistently, despite the framework outlined in Radmacher,
because there is no statutory guidance for interpreting and enforcing these agreements. Part IV will then suggest that, pending legislative reform, English courts should subject foreign
marital agreements to a conflict-of-laws inquiry, which would remove the incentive to forum shop foreign premarital agreements
into England, where nonmoneyed spouses would no longer be
able to invalidate their foreign marital agreements. This solution will be illustrated by examining a similar approach used by
courts in Singapore, whereby courts perform a conflict-of-laws
analysis for foreign marital agreements and apply the proper
law of the contract to the marital agreement, even if that law is
not the lex fori.35 Singapore has been successful at implementing
a streamlined yet comprehensive conflict-of-laws approach for
foreign marital agreements, which deters prospective forum
shoppers and results in validly executed foreign marital agreements being enforced.36
I. THE HISTORY AND STATE OF THE LAW IN ENGLAND BEFORE
RADMACHER
The English matrimonial law regime acts as the default law
for divorce and related financial settlement determinations. In
turn, marital agreements seek to alter or confirm this default
law. Currently, the main statutory authority for matrimonial
law in England is the MCA, but, beginning in the nineteenth
century, the law on marital agreements has largely been shaped
by case law, due to the fact that the statutory law does not address marital agreements directly.

35. This Latin phrase translates to 9the law of the court or forum.8 Lex Fori,
LEGAL DICTIONARY, https://thelegaldictionary.org/dictionary/lex-fori/ (last visited May 24, 2017).
36. Wai Kum Leong, Marital Agreements and Private Autonomy in Singapore, in MARITAL AGREEMENTS AND PRIVATE AUTONOMY IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 311, 349 (Jens M. Scherpe ed., 2012).
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A. The Historical Approach to Marital Agreements in England
and the Underlying Policy Concerns
The law in England regarding /arital agree/ents 9has re[
mained remarkably impervious to change over the past century
and a halL837 and is historically hostile to the idea of prospective
spouses contracting around the default matrimonial law.38 Historically, this unwillingness to accept marital agreements
stemmed from the fear that marital agreements allowed parties
to collude to end their marriage and that, because these agreements anticipated divorce, they encouraged it and, in some
cases, created financial incentives to get divorced.39 Marriage
was seen as essential to the fabric of society, both in a religious
and economic sense, and anything that threatened the sanctity
of marriage was poorly received.40 These concerns linger today
but are accompanied by the concern that marital agreements, by
allowing parties to contract around default law, remove power
from the state and consequently may make the state less able to
protect vulnerable parties.41
Historically, discussion of marital agreements most often
arose in the context of marriage contracts, which were drawn up
to solemnize unions that today are known as arranged marriages.42 In 1844, an English court considered such an agreement by a wife, who claimed she was entitled to financial support upon her divorce.43 The Qourt QonQluded: 9Where the d/ari[
tal] contract is that, in the event of any separation taking place
between the husband and the wife, the husband shall make a
certain provision for his wife, the Court sees that it is an induce/ent to the wiLe to be guilty oL the worst QonduQtZ844 The general
jurisprudence during this era reflected a real concern that marital agreements could create a financial incentive for divorce and
undermine the institution of marriage.45 Courts were unwilling

37. Rains, supra note 27, at 455.
38. See id.
39. See Miles, supra note 26, at 97.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See Rains, supra note 27, at 455.
43. Id. at 455N56.
44. Id. at 456 (quoting Cocksedge v. Cocksedge (1844) 60 Eng. Rep. 351N53,
[246]N[47] (Eng.)).
45. See Miles, supra note 26.
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to accept agreements that sought to facilitate divorce in the future, as divorces were designed to be difficult to obtain, thus acting as a deterrent.46
This judicial distaste for agreements anticipating separation
or divorce was echoed in 1857, when a court articulated the rule
that 9no state oL Luture separation Qan ever be Qonte/plated by
agreement made either before or after marriage . . . it is forbidden to provide Lor the possible dissolution oL the /arriageZ847
Even as recently as the 1960s, marital agreements were akin to
9Qollusion8 in the eyes oL so/e English Judges,48 showing that the
historical hostility to anything that facilitates obtaining a divorce, including marital agreements, pervades the jurisprudence.
Yet, this historical attachment to the institution of marriage
and the legal and economic protections it provides must be reconQiled with the /odern reQognition oL an individual’s right to
create duties and rights through contracts.49 England has been
unique in its reluctance to enforce marital agreements in any
form,50 and this reluctance does not entirely stem from historical
concerns. Rather, this historical aversion to marital agreements
as instru/ents that /aHe divorQe 9easy8 is Qo/ple/ented by
modern policy considerations. A martial agreement, as a specific
type oL QontraQt, QirQu/vents the state’s power to QraLt a re/edy
in the event of a divorce.51 Un displaQing the state’s power, /ari[
tal agreements create a framework that excludes the state as the
ultimate arbiter of settlement upon divorce and confine the state

46. See Rains, supra note 27, at 455N56.
47. Id. at 456 (quoting H v. W (1857) 3 K. & J. 382 [387] (UK)).
48. The Right Honourable Lord Wilson of Culworth, Justice of the Supreme
Court of England, described an experience as a young solicitor, where his client
9absurdly8 remained married to her husband after the judge refused to grant
them a divorce in light of their 9collusion8 in reaching an agreement that resolved their financial issues prior to appearing in court. See Lord Wilson of
Culworth, Foreword, in MARITAL AGREEMENTS AND PRIVATE AUTONOMY IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE vii (Jens M. Scherpe ed., 2012).
49. See Debele & Rhode, supra note 4.
50. For comparison, U.S. courts began recognizing the validity of marital
agreements in the 1960s and 1970s. See id. England is not the only country
that still takes this position on enforcing marital agreements, but it is in the
minority. For a concise list of different national positions on marital agreement
law, see Cheong, supra note 16.
51. See Debele & Rhode, supra note 4.
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to enforce only certain equitable principles.52 Thus, by accepting
marital agreements, the state (through the courts) surrenders a
great deal of power to the parties, which is significant in a jurisdiction such as England, where judges currently exercise wide
discretion over matrimonial matters.53 This concern is valid, considering that, in England’s Qurrent syste/, JudiQial disQretion is
the primary means of ensuring fair outcomes and protecting vulnerable parties who may have unwittingly bargained away their
rights in a marital agreement.54 There is, however, ample evidence that judicial discretion is not the only way to protect individual parties to a marital agreement. Jurisdictions that allow
marital agreements have developed equitable principles that act
as substantive and procedural safeguards to protect the vulnerable parties entering into a marital agreements, both when
these agreements are executed and enforced.55
B. Statutory Matrimonial Law in England: The MCA
As English jurisprudence and policy have long been against
enforcing marital agreements, it is no surprise that, statutorily,
there is no provision that expressly validates the execution or
enforcement of marital agreements. 56 Thus, it is essential to examine the default matrimonial law in England, the MCA, as
marital agreements are interpreted within the context of this
underlying statutory framework. 57
52. Id.; see also Jens M. Scherpe, Marital Agreements and Private Autonomy
in Comparative Perspective, in MARITAL AGREEMENTS AND PRIVATE AUTONOMY
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 443, 489N511 (Jens M. Scherpe ed., 2012). Substantive safeguards include invalidating agreements that seek to evade
spousal support entirely or are against public policy and modifying agreements
when there was a material change in circumstances since the execution of the
agreement. See id. at 507N09. Procedural safeguards include requiring full financial disclosure from both parties, having both parties be represented by
independent counsel, and invalidating agreements that are signed under duress or in haste. See id. at 515N17.
53. See Miles, supra note 26, at 90N91.
54. See id.
55. These equitable principles are codified in U.S. law and are generally accepted as requisites throughout mainland Europe as well. For the most recent
scholarship, see UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT (NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2012) [hereinafter UPMAA].
56. See Nigel Lowe, Address Prepared for the ISFL Colloquium on Family
Law, Prenuptial Agreements: The English Position 1, 5 (Oct. 11, 2007),
http://www.indret.com/pdf/508_en.pdf.
57. See Scherpe, supra note 3, at 1.
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The MCA58 governs divorce and the determination of financial
settlements upon divorce.59 In determining financial settlements
in a divorQe aQtion, the M!# grants the Qourts powers oL 9anQil[
lary relieL,8 whiQh inQlude the power to issue binding LinanQial
orders.60 In providing ancillary relief, the court has vast discretion and is at liberty to
make property adjustment orders (including the [direct] transfer of ownership from one spouse to the other or even to any
child of the family); . . . order property to be sold and direct to
whom the proceeds should be paid; . . . order the one-off payment of lumps sums; . . . order the sharing of pension rights;
and . . . order [periodic payments].61

With respect to property, English matrimonial law operates
under a separate property regime, which does not embrace the
concept of community property (property owned jointly by a married couple, also known as matrimonial property).62 Yet, the
Qourts have 9eatensive powers to adJust spouses’ property and
LinanQial rights on divorQe dthatc tru/p the parties’ separate
property rightsZ863 Thus, the effects of the separate property regime are negligible in a sense, as the court pulls in all the same
property and assets that would be captured by a community
property regime.
The separate property distinction does, however, affect the
manner in which a financial settlement is made by an English
court. Because English statutory law does not recognize matrimonial property, courts frequently craft financial settlements
that do not distinguish between maintenance (usually a temporary, adjustable form of financial relief meant to cover monthly
living expenses) and property (a permanent property distribution).64 Thus, when an English court employs its powers of ancil-

58. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, c. 18 (Eng.).
59. The sections specific to financial settlement upon divorce are sections
25, 34, and 35.
60. See Miles, supra note 26, at 91; Rains, supra note 27, at 458; see also
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, §§ 23N24.
61. Lowe, supra note 56, at 3.
62. See Miles, supra note 26, at 90; Lowe, supra note 56, at 3.
63. Miles, supra note 26, at 91.
64. See id. at 93; Jens M. Scherpe, Foreign Marital Agreements: The Approach of the English Courts, 3 PRIV. CLIENT BUS. 190, 193 (2010). It is im-
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lary relief to make a financial determination, the division of assets (property, money, etc.) is also meant to cover monthly financial needs going forward.65
This system is fundamentally different from the rest of continental Europe and the United States, where courts normally divide matrimonial property and make separate awards of maintenance, where necessary.66 Maintenance awards are flexible and
can be adjusted based on the income of the payor and payee, remarriage, and other life events.67 Property distributions, however, are final determinations of ownership and cannot be adjusted.68 Thus, there is a great deal at stake in an English property settlement, where maintenance is assumed to be included
in the property distribution, and property distributions are permanent and final. This also provides one explanation for English
Qourts’ unwillingness to Qonsider foreign law when evaluating a
foreign marital agreement. Marital agreements drafted outside
of England often contemplate property and maintenance separately because they were drafted to be enforced in a jurisdiction
that makes this distinction. Yet, because England’s syste/ does
not distinguish between property and maintenance, English
courts are unable to enforce these agreements by their terms.
Section 25 of the MCA outlines the factors for courts to consider when determining a financial settlement in a divorce action.69 The Qourt’s duty in deQiding whether to eaerQise its power
of ancillary relief70 is to 9have regard to all the QirQu/stanQes oL
the Qase,8 with e/phasis on the Lollowing LaQtors: eaQh party’s
income, earning capacity, financial needs, the standard of living
previously enjoyed by the family, the age of each party, the duration oL the /arriage, eaQh party’s past or Loreseeable Luture
Qontribution to the welLare oL the La/ily, eaQh party’s QonduQt, iL
portant to note that periodic payments are available as a form of ancillary relief, but these are rarely implemented in practice. See Matrimonial Causes Act
1973, c. 18, § 24 (Eng.).
65. See Miles, supra note 26, at 93; Scherpe, supra note 52.
66. See Miles, supra note 26, at 93; Scherpe, supra note 52.
67. For further discussion about the basic distinction between maintenance
and property, see generally Overview of Chapters 4 (Division of Property Upon
Dissolution) and 5 (Compensatory Spousal Payments), in PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION (AM. LAW INST. 2002).
68. See id.
69. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, § 25.
70. These ancillary powers are outlined in sections 23 and 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. See id. §§ 23N24.
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it would be inequitable to disregard it, and the value of any benefit that either party stands to lose as a result of the dissolution
or annulment of the marriage.71 The MCA thus allows courts
wide discretion to craft a financial settlement that best suits the
parties, but notably, does not include marital agreements as one
of the factors for a court to consider.72
Sections 34 and 35 of the MCA govern maintenance agree/ents _also Hnown as 9separation agree/ents8^, whiQh are
agreements between spouses that outline the rights and liabilities toward one another when living separately, prior to divorce.73 Maintenance agreements differ from marital agreements because separation agreements apply only to the time period between separation and divorce.74 In the past, sections 34
and 35 have provided guidance to drafters of marital agreements
as to the type and manner of provisions a court will enforce. Reliance on this section of the statute, however, is complicated because it contains an inherent contradiction.75 Section 34 provides that, 9dicL a /aintenanQe agreement includes a provision
purporting to restrict any right to apply to a court for an order
containing financial arrangements, then that provision shall be
voidZ8 76 :eQtion DC also states that 9any other LinanQial arrange[
ments contained in the agreement shall . . . be binding on the
parties to the agree/ent,877 leading to the perplexing result that
the financial arrangements laid out in a maintenance agreement
could be both void and binding. Section 35, which also relates to
maintenance agreements, is similarly muddled and does not
lend itself to clear understanding. It allows a court to alter the
terms of a maintenance agreement if the court is satisfied that
circumstances have changed since the agreement was made.78
Thus, under sections 34 and 35 of the MCA, a maintenance
agreement has equal chances of being ruled void, binding, or adjustable.79 Wurther, under the deLault property regi/e, 9all the
spouses’ assets, however and whenever aQ*uired, are subJeQt to
71. Id. § 25.
72. Id.
73. See Rains, supra note 27, at 459. A maintenance agreement under English law is the equivalent of a separation agreement in the United States. Id.
74. See id. at 460.
75. See id. at 460.
76. Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, c. 18, § 34(1)(a) (Eng.).
77. Id. § 34(1)(b).
78. See Rains, supra note 27, at 459.
79. See id. at 460.
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the Qourt’s eatraordinarily wide powers doL anQillary relief] and
are thereLore at risH oL being redistributedZ880 Thus, a great deal
is at stake in drafting a marital agreement, and the existing default statutory law does not give clear guidance as to how to draft
an agreement so that it will be enforced.
C. The English Courts and Marital Agreements
Aside from granting judges wide judicial discretion under the
MCA, statutory law has done little to create a modern matrimonial framework in the English courts.81 Not surprisingly, English courts have become the driving force in defining and modernizing matrimonial law and, by default, marital agreement
law (but with limited success). By way of example, the drafters
of the MCA failed to include a clear statement of the overall objective a court should strive for when applying their powers of
ancillary relief.82 Currently, the MCA gives judges enormous discretion and also allows them to decide how to use it.83 The House
of Lords in White v. White clarified the overall judicial objective
courts should seek under the MCA when determining a settlement upon divorce, holding that the underlying objective is to
9aQhieve a Lair outQo/e between the parties as Judged against
the yardstiQH oL e*ualityZ884
Un deter/ining /arital LinanQial settle/ents, the 9yardstiQH oL
e*uality8 translates into Qourts e/ploying a 9Lairness8 standard
to guide judicial determinations.85 In theory, fairness, applied in
the context of marital financial settlements, can result in appropriately tailored outcomes for families and their unique circumstances.86 It can, however, also result in vast uncertainty for
spouses who would prefer to settle their marital finances autonomously and without judicial interference by executing a marital
agreement.87 The fairness inquiry is further guided by factors
80. Lowe, supra note 56, at 5.
81. See Miles, supra note 26, at 90N91.
82. See Lowe, supra note 56, at 5.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 4. See generally White v. White [2000] UKHL 54.
85. Fairness is determined by inquiring into 9whether the enforcement of
the agreement would cause significant injustice, or whether the agreement itself is fair.8 Harper & Frankle, supra note 18, at 137.
86. See generally Jens M. Scherpe, Questionnaire, in MARITAL AGREEMENTS
AND PRIVATE AUTONOMY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 9 (Jens M. Scherpe ed.,
2012).
87. See generally id.
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laid out in section 25 of the MCA, and particularly the following
three principles articulated in subsequent case law: 88 equal
sharing,89 needs,90 and compensation.91 It is decidedly unclear,
however, 9how the prinQiples interrelate in praQtiQe,892 particularly in regards to divorces that involve a marital agreement,
showing that the JudiQiary’s ability to Line-tune the MCA is limited at best.
For many years, the seminal English case regarding marital
agreements was Hyman v. Hyman, where the court held that
marital agreements are against public policy and thus invalid.93
The decision stressed that no private agreement could subvert
the Qourt’s JurisdiQtion over LinanQial settle/ents in a divorQe aQ[
tion.94 This precedent was followed almost unchanged from the
date of its decision in 1929, to as recently as 1999, when the court
in N v. N noted that 9dtche attitude oL the English Qourts to d/ar[
ital] agreements . . . has always been that they are not enforceableZ895
In the years since, English jurisprudence has evolved slowly,
and courts will now consider a marital agreement as some evidenQe oL the parties’ intentions when /aHing LinanQial settle[
ment determinations.96 The post-2000 case law indicates that
marital agreements are a material consideration in the financial

88. See Miles, supra note 26, at 94.
89. Equal sharing refers to the 9sharing of the fruits of the matrimonial
partnership of equals (sometimes referred to as 6entitlement’).8 Lowe, supra
note 56, at 4.
90. Needs are thought of as those 9(primarily housing and financial) generated by the relationship between the parties. This is often where the search for
fairness begins and ends since in most cases the available assets are insufficient to provide adequately for the needs of two homes.8 Id.
91. Compensation is usually employed 9for relationship-generated disadvantage.8 Id. This occurs when one spouse has made significant financial sacrifice (in terms of earning potential or otherwise) for the benefit of the family
unit. Id.
92. Courts will often address compensation (as in for a spouse who sacrificed
earning potential to be a caregiver) as an element of need or equal sharing. See
Miles, supra note 26, at 94; Harper & Frankle, supra note 18, at 137N38.
93. Hyman v. Hyman [1929] AC 601 at 628N29 (UK).
94. The court held that 9the wife’s right to future maintenance is a matter
of public concern, which she cannot barter away. . . .8 Id.
95. Lowe, supra note 56, at 6 (quoting Justice Wall in N v. N [1999] EWHC
(Fam) 838, [34] (Eng.)).
96. See id. at 7.
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settle/ent upon divorQe, either as a part oL 9all the QirQu/[
stanQes8 in Qonsideration or as 9QonduQt8 that the Qourt is di[
rected to take into account under the MCA section 25 factors.97
Under the conduct inquiry, the existence of a marital agreement
Qan serve as evidenQe oL the party’s intention to be bound by a
marital agreement generally or as proof of consent to some or all
of the terms outlined in the agreement.98 Though not considered
enforceable, marital agreements play an important evidentiary
roleZ That said, England re/ains 9al/ost alone not only in Eu[
rope but also a/ong other Qo//on law JurisdiQtions8 in reLusing
to recognize marital agreements as binding contracts.99
II. THE RADMACHER DECISION AND PARLIAMENT’S FAILURE TO
RESPOND WITH REFORM
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, English jurisprudence on marital agreements shifted course significantly
from viewing them as contrary to public policy to acknowledging
that, under certain circumstances, they might be enforceable.
Responding to lower courts acknowledging marital agreements
as evidenQe oL the parties’ intentions, the two highest Qourts in
England addressed marital agreements almost simultaneously.
These courts vacated the old rule laid down in Hyman v. Hyman,
which stated that marital agreements are invalid as contrary to
public policy, and attempted to create a modern framework for
courts to interpret marital agreements going forward. Concurrently, the Law Commission issued a report on marital agreements and recommended legislation legitimizing such agreements.100 To no avail, both the courts and the Law Commission
invited Parliament to formally recognize marital agreements as
binding contracts.101 In 2008, the Board of the Privy Council102
97. Id. at 7; see also Ella v. Ella [2007] EWCA (Civ) 99 (Eng.) (holding that
the marital agreement played a 9major factor8 in the case); M v. M [2002] 1
FLR 654 (Eng.) (holding that the existence of a marital agreement served as a
factor in granting the nonmoneyed spouse a 9more modest award than might
have been made without it8).
98. Lowe, supra note 56, at 6.
99. Id. at 5.
100. See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 32.
101. See Macleod v. MacLeod [2008] UKPC 64; Radmacher v. Granatino
[2010] UKSC 42.
102. Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom does not have one highest court of appeal. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is the court of
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decided MacLeod v. MacLeod. In MacLeod, the Board of the
Privy Council considered the marital agreement of a U.S. couple
who got married in Florida and who had been residing on the
Isle of Man, a Crown dependency.103 In its decision, the court
opined that 9the difficult issue of the validity and effect of [marital] agreements is more appropriate to legislative rather than
judicial development,8104 but it ultimately held that the marital
agreement in question was valid and enforceable.105 The court,
however, ruled that the provisions that explicitly sought to oust
the jurisdiction of the court were void, showing the Board of the
Privy !ounQil’s reluQtanQe to Lully sanQtion a doQu/ent that
would circumvent their traditional powers of ancillary relief.106
The "oard oL the Privy !ounQil’s holding eLLeQtively vacated the
long-held precedent of Hyman v. Hyman and 9swept away Z Z Z
the old rule that agreements providing for future separation are
Qontrary to publiQ poliQyZ8107 In spite of this departure from established precedent and the Board of the Privy CounQil’s eapliQit
request for legislative guidance on the matter, parliament remained silent.
Two years after MacLeod, in October of 2010, the Supreme
Court of England laid down a highly anticipated decision in
Radmacher v. Granatino.108 While Radmacher was initially

final appeal for overseas U.K. territories, Crown dependencies, and the Commonwealth countries that have retained the appeal to Her Majesty in Council.
The Supreme Court of England is the court of final appeal for England proper.
See JUD. COMMITTEE PRIVY COUNCIL, https://www.jcpc.uk (last visited Apr. 17,
2017). The Supreme Court of England is not bound by the precedent of the
Board of the Privy Council, and vice versa, but the two highest courts look to
one another as persuasive authority. See Kentridge, supra note 3.
103. The Isle of Man is a British territory. See Harper & Frankle, supra note
18, at 140.
104. Macleod [2008] UKPC [35].
105. See id.
106. See id. The court found it significant that the marital agreement was
postnuptial and not prenuptial (a distinction not discussed here); more importantly, however, the court held that marital agreements are legally valid.
Id.
107. Kentridge, supra note 3.
108. See Pre-nuptial Victory for Heiress, BBC NEWS (July 2, 2009, 1:17 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/8130176.stm.
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hailed as a groundbreaking decision,109 it has not drastically altered judicial treatment of marital agreements.110 Rather, it reflects a peak in the gradual judicial recognition of marital agreements as at least some evidence in financial settlement determinations.111 In Radmacher, the Supreme Court of England echoed
the senti/ents oL the "oard oL the Privy !ounQil’s earlier deQi[
sion in MacLeod.112 In Radmacher, the court addressed whether,
and to what extent, a court should take into account a foreign
marital agreement when exercising its ancillary powers of relief
under section 25 of the MCA.113 The parties involved were Katrin Radmacher, a German heiress, and Nicholas Granatino, a
French banker turned professor.114 Their marital agreement,
which was of German origin and declared itself to be governed
by German law, provided that neither party would claim the assets or income of the other in the event of a divorce.115 The parties filed for divorce in England in 2007, while they were living
in London, and Granatino requested £6.9 million from his former
spouse.116
The case reached the Supreme Court of England in 2010, and
the court, citing MacLeod, held that, when considering marital
agree/ents, 9dac Qourt should give eLLeQt to a d/aritalc agree[
ment that is freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its implications unless in the circumstances prevailing
it would not be Lair to hold the parties to their agree/entZ8117 In
determining the validity of a marital agreement, the court formulated the following three-part inquiry:

109. See id.
110. See Harper & Frankle, supra note 18, at 123.
111. See Lowe, supra note 56, at 7.
112. Thus, the two highest courts in England were in agreement that marital
agreements are legally valid documents. See Kentridge, supra note 3.
113. Id.
114. Radmacher v. Granatino [2010] UKSC 42.
115. See PLC Private Client, Supreme Court Upholds Prenuptial Agreement
in Radmacher Case, THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL L. (Nov. 3, 2010),
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/4-5036520?__lrTS=20170418014011262&transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp=1; see also Kentridge, supra note 3.
116. See PLC Private Client, supra note 115.
117. Radmacher [2010] UKSC 42, [75] (quoting MacLeod v. MacLeod [2008]
UKPC 64).
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A. Were there circumstances attending the making of the
agreement that detract from the weight that should be accorded to it?
B. Were there circumstances attending the making of the
agreement that enhance the weight that should be accorded to
it; the foreign element?
!Z fid the QirQu/stanQes prevailing when the Qourt’s order was
made make it fair or just to depart from the agreement?118

Un the Part # analysis, the Qourt deter/ined that, 9iL the ter/s
of the agreement are unfair from the start, this will reduce its
weight,8 and outlined several LaQtors to Qonsider in /aHing this
determination, including: the existence of undue influence or
pressure, disclosure of financial and material information, intent of the parties to be bound, the parties emotional states, their
age and maturity, whether the parties had been in long-term relationships before, and whether the marriage would have gone
ahead without an agreement. 119 Here, the court did not find any
mitigating forces to be an issue in the parties’ agree/entZ120
With respect to Part B, the court found that the foreign nature
oL the /artial agree/ent entitled it to 9deQisive weight,8 but that
the Loreignness was si/ply one oL several LaQtors that 69LortiLied’
the conclusion to give the agree/ent deter/inative weightZ8121
The English Qourt 69eyeballdedc’ the Loreign law8122 but did not
perform a choice-of-law analysis.123 Instead, under the English
Qourt’s analysis, the LaQt that the /arital agree/ent Qould have
been binding in both Germany and France124 merely established
the intention of the parties to be bound generally,125 but it did
not necessarily make the agreement binding in England. As a
118. Id. [76]N[113].
119. None of these factors were held to be equivocal. See id. [68]N[73].
120. See Kentridge, supra note 3.
121. Miles, supra note 26, at 119 (referring to the Court of Appeal’s analysis).
The opinion of the Supreme Court of England did not directly comment on the
foreign nature of the agreement. See Kentridge, supra note 3.
122. Miles, supra note 26, at 119.
123. Under Rome I, a regulation providing for choice-of-law in contract, a foreign commercial contract is typically subject to a choice-of-law analysis within
the European Union. See Council Regulation 593/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 177) (EC).
Until England formally exits the European Union, they remain bound by such
policies.
124. See Kentridge, supra note 3.
125. See Miles, supra note 26, at 119.
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result, while the court acknowledged the foreign nature of the
contract, it simply disregarded the conflict-of-laws issue, ultimately emphasizing that English law alone governed the case.126
Un the Part ! analysis, the Qourt reiterated the rule that 9the
overriding criterion to be applied in ancillary relief proceedings
is that oL Lairness8 and Qonsidered the three elements that traditionally Qo/prise the 9Lairness8 in*uiry: need, Qo/pensation,
and sharing.127 Here, the court found that, in terms of need and
sharing, it was unnecessary for the wife to share her family fortune because the husband renounced any claim in the marital
agreement,128 and, as a banker turned professor, he was generally able to provide for his own needs.129 Further, with respect to
compensation, the court found no reason to compensate the husband for sacrifices made on behalf of the family because he did
not make any during the marriage.130
The Radmacher decision was groundbreaking in the sense that
the Supreme Court of England formally swept away the notion
that marital agreements are invalid as contrary to public policy,131 while articulating a thoughtful, nuanced approach for determining the weight they should be given. While the court valiantly attempted to create a workable standard, it ultimately
failed to set out a framework that produces consistent results in
practice, as demonstrated by subsequent case law, because the
judiciary has a limited ability to make law and policy in this
realm.132 Despite the test laid out in the majority opinion directing future courts regarding marital agreements, the dissenting
opinion in Radmacher foresaw the need for legislative reform
and echoed MacLeod,133 opining 9dtchere is not /uQh doubt that
the law of marital agreements is a mess . . . [and] is ripe for syste/atiQ review and reLor/Z8134

126. See id.
127. Radmacher v. Granatino [2010] UKSC 42, [75].
128. See Kentridge, supra note 3.
129. His own needs (including for housing) would, to a large extent, be met
indirectly by the provision made for him to care for his daughters until the
younger daughter reached the age of 22. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See generally GS v. L [2011] EWHC (Fam) 1759; B v. S [2012] EWHC
(Fam) 265; Z v. Z (No 2) [2011] EWHC (Fam) 2878.
133. See Radmacher v. Granatino [2010] UKSC 42, [133]N[134].
134. Id. [133].
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Prior to Radmacher, English courts expressly requested legislative guidance with respect to the validity of marital agreements.135 In response, in 2008, the Law Commission initiated a
project to look into the status and enforceability of marital agreements.136 Following Radmacher, the Law !o//ission’s report
took on new importance, as the law had reached a confusing impasse.137 Statutorily, marital agreements remained unenforceable, but case law afforded them whatever weight a particular
court chose to give them using the Radmacher factors.138 Lord
Justice Hoffman described this strange status *uo as 9the worst
oL both worldsZ8139
The Law !o//ission’s Linal report was issued in Webruary
2014.140 The report acknowledged Radmacher and noted that the
courts have gone as far as possible in endorsing the validity of
marital property agreements without an amendment to the statutory Lra/eworH, and that 9only legislation Qan enable parties
to enLorQe agree/ents without involving the Qourts’ disQretion[
ary JurisdiQtion under the Matri/onial !auses #Qt F>@DZ8141 The
report recommended statutory confirmation of the contractual
validity of marital agreements and introduced a model form for
such agreementsKthe 9*ualiLying nuptial agree/ent8Kwith
built-in procedural safeguards that would enable parties to enforce agreements without judicial interference.142 The report
acknowledged that the Supreme Court of England has pushed
the law as far as is possible toward endorsing the validity of marital property agree/ents, and that 9only legislation Qan enable Z
. . couples to make contractual, and truly enforceable arrangements about the financial consequences of divorce or dissolutionZ8143

135. See generally MacLeod v. MacLeod [2008] UKPC 64.
136. See Kentridge, supra note 3.
137. See Harper & Frankle, supra note 18, at 133.
138. See id. at 133.
139. Id.
140. See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 32.
141. Id. para. 1.34.
142. See id. paras. 1.32, 1.35, at x (defining a 9qualifying nuptial agreement8
as 9a marital property agreement which is enforceable, providing certain conditions are met, without the need for the agreement to be scrutinized by the
court in its discretionary jurisdiction. Such agreements are not available under
the current law.8); see also Cooke & Clark, supra note 32.
143. See id. para. 1.34.
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Immediately following the publication of the 2014 report, a bill
was introduced into the House of Lords that would have enacted
/any oL the Law !o//ission’s suggestionsZ144 The first reading
of the bill took place in the month of its introduction145 but has
since stalled and is unlikely to proceed further.146 Further, no
alternative legislative proposals have been introduced and parlia/ent has not ade*uately addressed the 9/uddled state oL the
lawZ8147
III. THE PROBLEMATIC EFFECT OF ENGLISH LAW ON FOREIGN
MARITAL AGREEMENTS
The English position on marital agreements remains highly
mercurial and poses a significant risk to holders of foreign marital agreements who expect such agreements to be enforced.
England does not subject foreign marital agreements to a conflict-of-laws analysis, so as long as an English court has jurisdiction over the parties, English law is applied, regardless of the
origin of the marital agreement, the nationality of the parties,
or the presence of a forum selection clause. The MCA and international legal developments make it relatively easy for foreign
144. See Baroness Deech’s Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill to Receive Second Reading on 27th June, FAM. LAW WK. (June 17, 2014), http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed130366. The bill reflects a comprehensive reform of existing law and proposes that
a [marital] agreement is to be treated as binding unless N (a)
the agreement attempted to impose an obligation on a third
party who had not agreed in advance to be bound by it; (b) a
party did not receive his or her own legal advice before the
agreement was made; (c) the agreement was made less than
21 days before the marriage; (d) there was no full disclosure
of assets as between the parties before it was made; or (e) the
agreement is unenforceable under the rules of contract law.
Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill, 2014 [HL] Bill 89, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2013-2014/0089/14089.pdf.
145. To become law, a bill must pass through five phases in the House of
Lords, five phases in the House of Commons, the consideration of amendments,
and the royal assent. The second reading for the bill has not been scheduled,
and as 9the 2013-2014 Parliament has prorogued . . . this bill will make no
future progress.8 See Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill [HL] 2013-14, supra
note 33.
146. See id.
147. Kentridge, supra note 3.
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parties to come under the jurisdiction of the English courts. Despite the advanQes /ade in England’s treat/ent oL /arital
agreements in Radmacher, forum shopping is still a problem, as
evidenced by the continued inconsistent treatment of foreign
marital agreements in English courts.
A. Forum Shopping: How It Works and Why the Current English Matrimonial System Attracts Forum Shoppers
From an international perspective, the English legal system
has earned a reputation Lor having what has 9unLlatteringly
[been] called a parochial attitude towards the resolution of finanQial and property disputes Lollowing divorQeZ8148 In English
courts, 9La/ily law disputes are governed by English law Z Z Z re[
gardless of the nationality or domicile of the parties, their habitual residence at the time of marriage and/or of making a marital
property agreement, or any choice of law clause in that agree/entZ8149 English courts have exhibited unwavering reluctance
to apply any law other than their own when evaluating the validity of a marital agreement,150 which has enormous substantive implications, especially when viewed in light of the ease
with which one can fall under the jurisdiction of an English court
for a divorce proceeding.
In terms of jurisdiction over divorce, English courts defer to
both domestic and international law, but it is quite simple for a
divorce action and the related financial settlement determination to Lall under the English Qourts’ JurisdiQtionZ151 Under the
MCA,
so long as the parties have been married for at least one year,
under the [MCA], the English court has jurisdiction to undertake divorce (and ancillary relief) proceedings where either of
the parties of the marriage is domiciled in England [or] Wales
at the date of commencement of the proceedings, or where either of them has habitually been a resident in England [or]
Wales throughout the period of one year ending on such date.

148. Miles, supra note 26, at 114.
149. Id. at 115.
150. See Mair, supra note 3; see also Miles, supra note 26, at 115.
151. See James Copson, The Attitude of the English Court to Conflict of Jurisdiction in Divorce and Related Financial Proceedings, 34 FAM. L.Q. 177, 177
(2000).
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The place of celebration of the marriage, the residence or domicile of the parties at the date of the marriage and current citizenship are, in themselves, immaterial. 152

Under the Brussels II regulation, EU Member States must follow the 9Lirst-seised rule,8 which provides that, once divorce proceedings have been initiated in an English court, the parties are
bound by that JurisdiQtion’s Judg/ent oL divorQeZ153 Thus, a party
wishing to avoid jurisdiction in England may seek to stay divorce
proceedings in an English court and request relief in another jurisdiQtion, but this is by no /eans a 9Lail-saLe /ethod8 oL avoid[
ing the application of English law to the financial settlement determination.154 The impending Brexit further exacerbates the
uncertainty. On June 23, 2016, England voted to exit the European Union, and it is unknown whether the jurisdictional rules
under Brussels II will still apply to England, as the exact terms
and ti/ing oL England’s eait Lro/ the European 7nion re/ain
unclear because they have yet to be negotiated.155
152. Id.
153. See Miles, supra note 26, at 115. With respect to jurisdiction,
Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 (Brussels II (bis))
which essentially provides that first in time wins, i.e. the first
EU state in which divorce proceedings are initiated shall
hear the divorce. A court is deemed to be seised of jurisdiction
for Brussels II (bis) purposes when the document initiating
the proceedings, or an equivalent document, is lodged with
the court, provided that the applicant has not subsequently
failed to take the steps he or she was required to take to have
service effected on the respondent.
Harper & Frankle, supra note 18, at 129.
154. Despite seeking a stay of the financial settlement, English law could apply regardless where
the English court . . . might not regard that forum as being
more convenient, or even available as a forum . . . [or] where
the competing forum would, as a result of the English divorce,
treat English law as the applicable law for dealing with the
property and financial matters.
Miles, supra note 26, at 118.
155. On June 23, 2016, a majority of U.K. voters (52 percent) voted to leave
the European Union. The terms of withdrawal have yet to be formally negotiated. See Alex Hunt & Brian Wheeler, Brexit: All You Need to Know About the
UK Leaving the EU, BBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/ukpolitics-32810887.
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For non-EU Member States, where divorce proceedings in
England are opposed, the forum of divorce is usually determined
by the doctrine of forum non conveniens,156 the application of
which is also difficult to predict and will not necessarily preclude
the application of English law to a financial settlement determination if the parties or the marriage have significant ties to England.157
Once an English court has gained jurisdiction over a divorce,
English law will be applied. In this realm, England has been less
receptive to international law and notions of comity. In 2010,
sixteen EU Member States signed on to the Rome III regulation,
which provided for enhanced cooperation in choice-of-law determinations for divorce actions.158 The statute provided criteria for
determining the proper law to apply in the event of a divorce
between citizens of different Member States.159 Negotiations for
Rome III began in 2006, before Radmacher and the Law Com/ission’s EXFC report, at a ti/e when England was not yet ready
for a more liberal approach to matrimonial property, particularly where reform would potentially involve applying law other
than the lex fori.160 England, however, did not sign on to Rome
III, and if the Brexit is any indication, the country does not seem
inclined toward enhanced international cooperation with respect
to choice-of-law determinations in marital agreements.
Even since Radmacher, this closed-minded attitude toward
the application of foreign law in divorce actions has remained
unchanged.161 Under the current law, foreign marital agreements, unlike other contracts, are not entitled of a choice-of-law
analysis in English courts.162 The English fondness for applying
its own law is especially significant because English matrimonial law is fundamentally different than the rest of continental

156. For a discussion of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, see Edward L.
Bartlett Jr., The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAL. L. REV. 380
(1947).
157. See Harper & Frankle, supra note 18, at 130N31.
158. See Council Regulation (EC) 1259/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 343).
159. See id.
160. See HOUSE OF LORDS, EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, ROME III N CHOICE
OF LAW IN DIVORCE (2006).
161. See Fiona Kendall, What is Rome III and Why Is the UK Not a Participating Member State?, CLARION SOLIC. (June 30, 2014), http://www.clarionsolicitors.com/blog/what-is-rome-iii-and-why-is.
162. See id.
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Europe.163 All continental European jurisdictions recognize matrimonial property,164 whereas England does not embrace the
concept of community property between spouses.165 In practice,
this means that, where most European jurisdictions consider
maintenance awards separately from property distributions,
English law does not make this distinction.166 In England, financial settlement awards encompass both maintenance and a distribution of property.167 This fundamental difference explains
why English courts are often unwilling to be bound by foreign
marital agreements because, in England, ancillary relief is seen
as a 9paQHage deal,8 and the division oL property is also /eant to
cover needs of the other spouse, which in many other jurisdictions would be provided for in an award of maintenance.168 Thus,
foreign marital agreements that provide for division of property
and contemplate separate maintenance awards simply do not fit
within the framework of current English matrimonial law. In an
apparent eLLort to aQhieve a /ore e*uitable result, 9English
courts in recent years [have] recognized that it is desirable in
Qases with a Loreign aspeQt to have a 6sideways looH’ at the out[
come that would be achieved were the relevant foreign law to be
appliedZ8169 But, statutorily, section 25 of the MCA does not list
either foreign law or marital agreements as factors to consider
when determining a financial settlement,170 so it is unsurprising
that English courts have historically afforded little weight to foreign marital agreements in determining financial settlements
upon divorce.171 Radmacher illustrated this strange reality when
the English court refused to enforce a German marital agreement, signed by German and French spouses, which was valid
and enforceable in both Germany and France.172 Despite the
agreement to the contrary, the parties were still subject to the
English Qourt’s powers oL anQillary relieLZ173 Though the court
considered the marital agreement to be valid in the sense that it
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See Scherpe, supra note 64, at 191; Miles, supra note 26, at 93.
See Scherpe, supra note 64, at 191; Miles, supra note 26, at 93.
See Miles, supra note 26, at 90.
See Scherpe, supra note 64, at 193; Miles, supra note 26, at 90N93.
See Scherpe, supra note 64, at 193; Miles, supra note 26, at 90N93.
Scherpe, supra note 64, at 193.
Miles, supra note 26, at 119.
See Rains, supra note 27, at 458.
See Miles, supra note 26, at 114N15.
See Kentridge, supra note 3.
See id.
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was not against public policy, it ultimately did not strictly enforce its terms.174 The agreement merely served as some evidenQe to be Qonsidered in the Qourt’s deter/ination oL anQillary
relief.175
B. The Post-Radmacher Jurisprudence and Remaining Problems for Foreign Marital Agreements in England
Subsequent cases have brought to light the inconsistency and
unpredictability of the Radmacher framework, particularly with
respect to foreign marital agreements.176 This is largely because
Radmacher did little to reform domestic marital agreement law
in practice,177 and English courts apply English law to divorce
proceedings, regardless of the nationality of the parties or the
origin of the marital agreement.178 The post-Radmacher jurisprudence shows that English courts have reached wildly different outcomes in cases involving a foreign marital agreement but
generally demonstrate a reluctance to find that both parties to
the agreement possessed the requisite understanding of the
agree/ent’s i/pliQations at the time of execution.179 Their analysis tends to be conclusory and lacking in a clear application of
the Radmacher factors.
In 2011, two divorce cases involving foreign marital agreements reached the English courts. In GS v. L, the parties married and maintained their matrimonial home in Spain but lived
in London at the time of the divorce, which enabled an English
court to exercise jurisdiction over the parties.180 Prior to their
divorce, the parties executed two marital agreements under
Spanish law, but the English court found that the facts surrounding the execution of the documents rendered them invalid.181 In the agreements, the husband wanted the wife to be a
homemaker, but she felt financially vulnerable in that position.182 Further, they were executed at a ti/e when 9dthe hus[

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See id.
See id.
See cases cited supra note 132.
Harper & Frankle, supra note 18, at 143.
Harper & Frankle, supra note 18, at 143.
See Lang, supra note 20, at 249.
See GS v. L [2011] EWHC (Fam) 1759.
See id. [63].
See id. [63].
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bandc had been utterly preoQQupied with his worH8 and uninter[
ested in Lor/ali`ing the parties’ ownership oL assetsZ183 Ulti/ately, the Qourt asQertained that 9neither party had a Lull ap[
preciation of the implications of the nuptial agreementZ8184
That same year, in Z v. Z, an English court mostly upheld a
French marital agreement where the parties were French citizens living in London at the time of their divorce.185 Here, the
court found that both parties entered freely into the agreement
9with dac Lull understanding oL its i/pliQationsZ8186 The court
noted that the agree/ent was properly eaeQuted and 9would
have been binding dhadc the divorQe proQeeded in WranQeZ8187 The
court found no circumstances that rendered the agreement unfair, despite the husband expressly telling the wife, in writing,
that he would not enforce their marital agreement.188
When taken together, GS v. L and Z v. Z demonstrate that,
following Radmacher, English courts still reach wildly different
outcomes where parties seek to enforce foreign marital agreements. Radmacher QlariLied the English JudiQiary’s willingness
to accept marital agreements as at least some evidence of the
parties’ intentions,189 but the courts still lack statutory guidance
in determining whether to accept these agreements as binding
contracts, creating uncertainty for parties and practitioners who
seek to enforce such agreements and showing the limits of judgemade law in this area.
In 2012, an English court decided B v. S, where the parties
were foreign nationals living in England at the time of their divorce.190 They had executed two marital agreements, one when
they married in the Catalonia region of Spain, where the default
matrimonial regime of the region is separate property, and a
later one that confirmed the first agreement.191 Like in GS v. L,
the court held that the parties had entered into the agreement
without a full appreciation of its implications,192 as, at the time
183. Id. [65].
184. Id. [66].
185. See generally Z v. Z (No 2) [2011] EWHC (Fam) 2878.
186. Id. [45].
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Kentridge, supra note 3.
190. See generally B v. S (Financial Remedy: Marital Property Regime)
[2012] EWHC (Fam) 265.
191. Id.
192. Id. [34].
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oL eaeQution, 9there had been no disQussion at all as to whether
the [second] agreement was intended to be influential, let alone
binding, were the parties to divorQe in EnglandZ8193
That same year, an English court decided Kremen v. Agrest,
where a Russian couple who had previously entered into a marital agreement in Israel sought divorce in London.194 The court
attributed no weight to the marital agreement195 after finding
that the wife had entered into the agreement under pressure
from the husband, did not retain independent legal advice, and
laQHed a Qo/plete understanding oL the agree/ent’s i/plications.196
Taken together, B v. S and Kremen v. Agrest show that English
case law is moving further away from Radmacher and that
courts are becoming even less likely to enforce a martial agreement. The trend in post-Radmacher jurisprudence seems to be
that, in most cases, the court will find that at least one party
laQHed Lull appreQiation oL the agree/ent’s i/pliQations at the
time of execution, but the existence of an agreement is given at
least some arbitrary weight,197 thus creating a minefield for
practitioners and parties who are unable to predict how a court
will rule.
IV: A JUDICIALLY IMPLEMENTED SOLUTION: REMOVE THE
INCENTIVE TO FORUM SHOP BY APPLYING A CONFLICT-OF-LAWS
ANALYSIS TO FOREIGN MARITAL AGREEMENTS
England remains the 9divorQe Qapital oL the world,8198 and
praQtitioners argue 9there will be in the Qo/ing years an inQreas[
ing number of divorces involving what the European Commission Qalls 6international couplesZ’8199 One study estimated that
9the total nu/ber oL Qross-border marriages among 25-39-yearolds Z Z Z was about FE d/illionc in EXXX,8 and these nu/bers are

193. Id.
194. See generally Kremen v. Agrest (No 11) (Financial Remedy: Non-Disclosure: Post-nuptial Agreement) [2012] EWHC (Fam) 45.
195. Id.
196. See generally Lang, supra note 20.
197. See generally id.
198. Harper & Frankle, supra note 18, at 125.
199. Elizabeth Cooke, The Law Commission’s Consultation on Marital Property Agreements, in MARITAL AGREEMENTS AND PRIVATE AUTONOMY IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 144, 157 (Jens M. Scherpe ed., 2012).
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only rising with our increasingly mobile society.200 Whilst the
English courts are likely to continue to apply the lex fori in matri/onial /atters, 9it will be unrealistic for them not to be aware
of and take into account the property law of other jurisdictionsZ8201 To do otherwise will allow forum shoppers to continue
to profit from English law, as prospective divorcées seeking to
invalidate their marital agreements will continue to use England as a forum for their divorces for as long as the English system continues to incentivize this behavior.
Domestic matrimonial law reform is currently at a standstill,202 and Brexit was a strong indicator that national sentiment does not favor signing on to an international uniform law
on marital agreements.203 The present situation, where foreign
marital agreements are routinely disregarded by English courts,
is untenable. Going forward, British courts must adopt a different approach. Where parliament has failed, the judiciary should
take on a more active role to streamline its treatment of foreign
marital agreements without having to rely on parliament to
craft a new system. English courts should thus adopt a conflictof-laws analysis when faced with a foreign marital agreement.
This approach is not novel, but it is consistent with English
Qourts’ treat/ent oL Loreign QontraQts generallyZ Un England,
courts regularly utilize a conflict-of-laws analysis for international commercial contracts, thus demonstrating that courts are
both capable of such an analysis and cognizant of the importance
of performing one in nonmarital contracts.204
Practically, implementation of such an approach to foreign
marital agreements is best illustrated by examining the system
utilized by Singapore, a former British territory. One scholar,
Wai Su/ Leong, deQlared that 9the state oL d/arital agree/entc
law in :ingapore /ay well be about as good as law Qan be8205
because it is founded on basic principles of contract law and is
200. Herr and Madame, Señor and Mrs, supra note 17.
201. Cooke, supra note 199, at 157.
202. Despite the Law Commission’s report, its suggestions have not been incorporated into a bill with any likelihood of becoming law. See Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill [HL] 2013-14, supra note 33.
203. England’s surprising vote to exit the European Union seems to indicate
that English sentiment is more in favor of nationalism than enhanced cooperation in the international legal sphere.
204. See generally Zaphiriou, supra note 24.
205. See Leong, supra note 36, at 349.
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tempered by restrained judicial discretion. Under this conservative approach, foreign marital agreements are subject to a conflict-of-laws analysis206Kessentially the same as an international commercial contract would beKgenerally ensuring that
the proper law of the contract governs and that an equitable outcome is achieved.
In Singapore, upon reaching a Singaporean court, a marital
agreement is first analyzed from a purely contractual perspective.207 The court first inquires as to whether the agreement complied fully with the requirements of basic contract law.208 For an
agreement with foreign elements, the court then performs a
choice-of-law analysis to determine the proper law of the contract.209 Once the proper law is determined, the agreement is
evaluated under that JurisdiQtion’s lawZ210 This choice of law has
potentially massive substantive implications in terms of
whether a contract will be enforced or not, and by utilizing a
standard conflict-of-laws inquiry, a Singaporean court ensures
that the proper law is applied.
By way of example, in TQ v. TR and Another Appeal, Dutch
and Swedish prospective spouses executed a marital agreement
in the Netherlands and intended to set up a marital home in
England.211 #t the ti/e oL divorQe, the parties’ /arital home was
te/porarily loQated in :ingapore due to the husband’s busi[
ness.212 The agreement was in Dutch and incorporated Dutch
law.213 The foreign element raised a conflict-of-laws issue, and
beQause oL the parties’ nationalities, the te/porary nature oL
their residence in Singapore, and the nature of the agreement,
the Singaporean court determined Dutch law to be the proper
law of the contract,214 /eaning that the 9validity, interpretation
and eLLeQt oL the agree/ent8 was deter/ined in reLerenQe to
206. See id. at 334.
207. See id. at 321.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 344. The 9proper law of the contract8 is the jurisdiction’s law
that applies. As a former British territory, Singapore largely follows customary
European choice-of-law rules, and, essentially, this analysis is what a court
would perform for a commercial contract that did not specify choice of law or
specified a choice of law other than that of the forum seized. Id.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 330.
213. See id. at 344.
214. See id.
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Dutch law, not Singaporean law.215 The Singaporean court applied a Dutch legal analysis and accordingly found that the marital agree/ent was 9validly Lor/ed8 and substantively eLLeQ[
tive.216
Wurther, in 9very li/ited QirQu/stanQes,8 the :ingaporean
Qourts retain 9residuary disQretion8 to adJust provisions oL /ari[
tal agreements that would otherwise result in violations of public policy or inequitable outcomes.217 Singaporean jurisprudence
has warned against abusing this judicial discretion, opining that
judges should always 96have regard to the general prinQiples oL
the common law of contracts, if for no other reason than to place
some legal parameters on what would otherwise be a wholly substantive eaerQise oL disQretion on the part oL the QourtZ’8218
Adopting an approach akin to the one used by courts in Singapore would solve a number of the problems plaguing the current
English approach to foreign marital agreements. It would create
predictability for international parties entering into marital
agreements and would harmonize the treatment of marital
agreements with general principles of English contract law principles.219 English contract law recognizes the principle of freedom of contract and generally protects individual autonomy by
recognizing choice-of-law provisions in contracts.220 Most importantly, by including a conflict-of-laws analysis for foreign
marital agreements, England would give credence to valid for-

215. Id.
216. Id. at 321.
217. Id. at 323.
218. Id. at 348.
219. One practitioner notes, it is 9frustrating for clients who are considering
pre-nuptial agreements to be told that the agreement they sign, which will
likely cost a not insignificant sum to prepare, might be binding, but at the same
time might not.8 Harper & Frankle, supra note 18, at 143.
220. See generally Zaphiriou, supra note 24. English legal precedent favors
contractual freedom:
The weight of precedent in the United Kingdom favors free
choice of law governing the parties’ QontraQtual obligationsZ Z
. . Choice of law clauses are generally upheld unless they are
contrary to public policy or attempt to evade mandatory provisions of the law with which the contract is most substantially connected.
Id. at 312.
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eign agreements and remove the incentive to forum shop a divorce into English courts. In the wake of Brexit, there is even
more reason to effectuate such a change, as there is an impending legal vacuum of sorts, 221 and such a change will provide incentives to bolster the domestic legal regime by harmonizing
treatment of foreign contracts.
Conversely, embracing a conflict-of-laws analysis for foreign
marital agreements would bring new challenges as well, particularly for the judiciary. It would require additional effort of
Judges, who would potentially be applying another nation’s sub[
stantive matrimonial law. Like the Singaporean court that analyzed a marital agreement under Dutch law in TQ v. TR, such
an endeavor would require additional research. English courts,
however, have long demonstrated their ability to work through
conflict-of-law issues as well as substantive foreign law questions in commercial contracts, thus making it likely the judiciary
would prove to be equally savvy in the context of marital agreements. Yet, there is reluctance to accept marital agreements under traditional contract law principles due to the sensitive nature oL the 9bargain8 they represent and the related poliQy Qon[
cerns, including protecting vulnerable parties. This reticence,
however, is largely unwarranted, given that, under the new proposal, English judges would, similar to Singaporean judges, retain discretion to modify provisions that risk violating domestic
law or public policy. These restrained powers of discretion would
simply be less potent than the current ancillary powers of relief
exercised by English judges in divorce proceedings.
In sum, the benefits of subjecting foreign marital agreements
to a choice-of-law analysis outweigh the potential difficulties, as
this solution represents a rational temporary plan that is ready
to be implemented while English courts await legislative reform.
Although parliament has evidenced reluctance to address the
Law !o//ission’s Lindings, the judiciary can act immediately to
streamline its treatment of foreign marital agreements without
relying on parliament to craft a new system.

221. See id. at 311. Though the terms of England’s exit from the European
Union have not been negotiated, it is likely there will be holes in the legal
landscape where EU law once governed when England ceases to be bound by
EU protocols.
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CONCLUSION
Until English law changes, prospective divorcées seeking large
financial awards will continue to take advantage of the favorable
legal climate in England. The simple fact is that parties seeking
to invalidate marital agreements can generally obtain better
outcomes in English courts than anywhere else.222 That said,
marital agreements are contracts and should be treated accordingly.223 The Radmacher court valiantly attempted to produce
guidelines by which to evaluate these agreements,224 but this is
only effective if marital agreements are presumed to be binding
documents, a change that can only be achieved legislatively. As
post-Radmacher case law indicates, courts continue to treat
marital agreements less like contracts and more like evidence.225
As a world financial center, London is home to a number of
wealthy individuals, and the courts will continue to find themselves inundated with both foreign and domestic marital agreements. If England maintains the current approach to marital
agreements, particularly in disregarding foreign agreements,
there will surely be an international response. A Singapore-like
approach thus would be an appropriate stopgap measure, pending parliamentary reform, by which the courts can address this
issue as it affects foreign marital agreements.
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